III.Proportionality Approach of the European Court of Justice to Data Processing Issues
As a matter of fact, the history of the right to the protection of personal data…
The fundamental right to the “protection of personal data” is also explicitly recognised in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. As with all fundamental rights, limitations to the right to privacy and the right to data protection are subject to the requirements of article 52/1 of the Charter. They are “subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”.…
Besides these provisions, to understand the EU’s proportionality approach to data…
The ECJ has acknowledged its understanding of proportionality as follows:…
“The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an ... activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the …
In the case-law, the ECJ primarily evaluates whether there is a limitation of the…
By way of justification, the ECJ assesses whether the interference is in accordance…
And lastly, the ECJ assesses whether a limitation of the right to the protection…
For example, in the Huber Case, the storage of personally-identifying data was not considered necessary since the purpose of the processing was of a statistical nature and anonymous information could be used instead. The Court declared that such disclosure of personally-identifying data went beyond what is necessary for statistical purposes; therefore it could not be referred to as a proportionate interference/ measure to ensure the protection of public order.…
The Schecke case concerned the validity of two Community regulations on European agricultural funds, which stipulate disclosure of the
“Regard being had to the fact that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, paragraph 56) and that it is possible to envisage measures which affect less adversely that fundamental right of natural persons and which still contribute effectively to the objectives of the European Union rules in question, it must be held that, by requiring the publication of the names of all natural persons who were beneficiaries of EAGF and EAFRD aid and of the exact amounts received by those persons, the Council and the Commission exceeded the limits which compliance with the principle of proportionality imposes.”
So it can be said that, different from ECtHR case-law, the ECJ evaluates strict necessity…
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